Abstract: Wolf attack is a new kind of biometric specific vulnerability and wolf attack probability is defined as a maximum success probability of the wolf attack with one wolf sample. From a theoretical point of view, a possible approach for describing wolf attack probability has been proposed in recent years, yet very little is known about practical approach in using a minutiae pattern. In this paper we propose a making method of wolf fingerprints to show vulnerability against simple count matching system. Even though this approach is valid only in a simple model, it is closely related to wolf attack against the real fingerprint systems. The experimental results show that wolf fingerprint using a minutiae pattern can get very high wolf attack probability.
Introduction
Biometric systems provide an authentication process in which the user and server verify each other's identities by using physiological and behavioral traits. Fingerprint recognition is one of the most popular and effective biometric techniques. In recent years there has been considered that fingerprint security technology is no longer effective if and only if the fingerprint has leaked out. That is, fake finger (also called artificial finger) can fool fingerprint systems, especially at the sensor level [1] . Thereafter, numerous attempts have been made to overcome this problem by liveness detection.
However, in this paper our concern is to examine practical measure of wolf attack. Wolf attack is a new kind of biometric specific vulnerability and wolf attack probability is defined as a maximum success probability of the wolf attack with one wolf sample. From a theoretical point of view, a possible approach for describing wolf attack probability has been proposed in recent years [2] , yet very little is known about practical approach in using a minutiae pattern. In our recent study, we have considered this problem within the framwork of the biometric parameters [3, 4] . In this paper we propose a making method of wolf fingerprints to show vulnerability against simple count matching system. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes simple count matching system. Section 3 presents a making method of minutiae pattern and wolf fingerprint. Experimental results and conclusions are given in Section 4 and 5, respectively.
Simple count matching system
A minutiae matching is the most well-known method for fingerprint matching. In our simple count matching system, we basically use the spatial distance and the direction difference [5] . In addition to these parameters, a graphdecomposition tool, known as the Dulmage Mendelsohn decomposition is used in order to perform only one mapping of matching minutiae [6, 7] .
In general, a fingerprint system has consisted of two subsystems: feature extraction and matching. Feature extraction is the process of representing the captured image in some space to facilitate matching. In this paper, we use one package (called MINDTCT) provided by the NIST Fingerprint Image Software 2 for feature extraction [8] . The output of the MINDTCT module is a text file. This file reports the minutiae detection results. It has one space delimited line per minutiae containing its x and y coordinate, direction angle (called θ) and the minutiae quality (called q).
Let T and I be the representaiton of the template and input fingerprint, respectively [5] . This is represented as
where a and b denote the number of minutiae.
A minutiae m i and m j are considered matching if the spatial distance (sd ) between them is smaller than a given tolerance r 0 and the direction difference (dd ) is smaller than an angular tolerance θ 0 :
where C is the function that count the number of matched minutiae, T h is a threshold, genuine indicates that the claim is true and impostor indicates that the claim is false.
Added to these, aligning the two fingerprints is a important step in order to maximize the number of matching minutiae. In this paper, we simply shift the input fingerprint in the range of −100 to 100 and select the maximum number as the number of matching minutiae.
In particular, we found that the Dulmage Mendelsohn decomposition is a good tool for optimal minutiae mapping, but is beyond the scope of this paper. We recommend that the reader who is interested in the implementation refer to the Matlab function called dmperm [7] .
Minutiae pattern and wolf fingerprint
Finger minutiae are local point patterns present in a fingerprint image. As I described in the previous section, our simple count matching system is based on the spatial distance and the direction difference. Therefore we can easily think about the composition of wolf fingerprint with a relative high false accept rate.
In this paper, in order to make wolf fingerprint we utilize a minutiae pattern which is searched and extracted from a large fingerprint database. Figure 1 shows the diagram of making wolf fingerprint including making the minutiae pattern. The key idea of our wolf minutiae pattern is to prepare eight minutiae pattern against one minutia pattern in the template fingerprint. Using this method the generated wolf fingerprint image can be falsely accepted in the count matching systems. In a process for making minutiae pattern, there are two conditions under which a minutiae quality have to be greater than 90 and a minutiae direction should be exist in an angle range. This direction angle is in charge of a target angle in a matching step. If a target angle range is eight level, then we can get an eight minutiae pattern. Finally, wolf fingerprint will be comprised of the gathering data (called minutiae pattern set).
Experimental results
We tested the proposed algorithm on our private database which contained 100 fingerprints. A total of 20 people enrolled, kindly agreed to act as volunteers. The tested wolf fingerprint images are shown in Fig. 1 .
In these experiments, we choose a distance tolerance r 0 = 10 and an angular tolerance θ = 45 as a common parameters. In addition, another two parameters (quality q and shifting range (−100 ∼ 100)) were used to control the performance of our count matching system. Table I shows the results including EER (Equal Error Rate) and WAP (Wolf Attack Probability) depend on minutiae quality. In a first column, 'all' as a quality means all minutiae were used in this test. As I briefly described in Section 2, a shifting is needed to align input minutiae. The equal error rate is computed as the point where FAR (False Accept Rate) equal to FRR (False Reject Rate). WAP can be calculated as a FAR when using wolf fingerprint.
Figures 2 (above) shows the histogram of the number of matched minutiae in our count matching system against our private database and five wolf fingerprints. In our experiment, we have found that wolf fingerprint2 consisting of 20 × 20 minutiae pattern is most critical attack in our count matching system. Figure 2 (below) shows the minutiae collision probability against some acceptable probability. Here we assume that all templates have n minutiae which match with those of Wolf fingerprint regarding to the spacial distance. Moreover, we assume that, for any minutiae of a template and Wolf fingerprint, these two minutiae match regarding to the ridge direction with probability p, uniformly. Then, from the definition of the minutiae collision probability (MCP) in [2] , we have
for a given threshold τ . In test 3 (blue line in Fig. 2 (below) ), the threshold number is set at 10 (τ in the above equation) and the average number of minutiae is 29 (n in the above equation). In this case, when we apply p = 0.436 to the equation, we can obtain the theoretical result 0.8814 (88.14%) that is very similar to the experimental result of 88%. This means that if one target minutia was matched by one minutiae pattern set (consisting of eight minutiae) with a 43.6% probability, we can theoretically obtain 88.14% wolf attack probability. Compared to the Fig. 2 (below) , the experimental results shown in Table I could be different because the acceptable probability (p) is sensitive to the minutiae quality.
Conclusion
This paper showed a method that can make wolf fingerprint against simple matching system. We note that even though this method is valid only in a simple and public matching algorithm, it is closely related to wolf attack against another fingerprint systems too (such as score-based systems, this is performed by normalizing the number of matching minutiae by the average number of minutiae). Therefore, we should carefully consider designing a matching algorithm including a feature extraction algorithm in the biometric systems and must take some measure to cope with the security problem such as wolf attack.
